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Rough Seas:  The Greek-Turkish Aegean Sea 
Dispute and Ideas for Resolution 
JULIA VASSALOTTI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Aegean Sea (Aegean) dispute between Greece and Turkey is 
complex and long-standing.1 Both nations disagree on:  (1) the 
sovereignty of certain Greek islands, islets, and rocks;2 (2) the 
demilitarization of particular islands;3 (3) the continental shelf 
delimitation;4 (4) the territorial sea breadth;5 and (5) the extent of 
territorial airspace.6 
This paper explores the Greek-Turkish conflict concerning the 
continental shelf delimitation and the territorial sea breadth in the 
Aegean. Part II discusses the historical and legal background of the 
Aegean dispute. Part III describes the current Greek-Turkish conflict 
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and the territorial sea 
in the Aegean, including the nations’ arguments. Part IV examines 
possible resolutions to the Aegean dispute. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Hostile relations between Greece and Turkey developed when 
Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.7 Greece remained 
under Ottoman rule until the onset of the Greek War of Independence in 
 
* Conflicts Analyst, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Baruch 
College; J.D., Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Boston College. The author would like 
to thank her family, friends, and colleagues for their valuable guidance and advice. 
 1. See YÜCEL ACER, THE AEGEAN MARITIME DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ix 
(2003). 
 2. See id. at 19–22. 
 3. See id. at 23–24. 
 4. Id. at 36–42. 
 5. See id. at 27–34. 
 6. Id. at 34–36. 
 7. See RICHARD CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GREECE 7 (2d ed. 2002). 
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1821.8 Support from Britain, France, and Russia enabled Greece to 
defeat the Ottoman Turks.9 The Treaty of Constantinople marked the 
end of the Greek War of Independence and created a sovereign Greek 
state.10 
The Ottoman Empire continued to decline in the early twentieth 
Century.11 During the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–12, the Ottomans lost 
Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands to the Italians.12 Subsequently, the 
Ottoman Empire surrendered Crete and most of the eastern Aegean 
islands to Greece at the conclusion of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.13 
The Treaty of Peace with Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne) established 
the borders of modern Turkey.14 The Treaty of Lausanne ended the 
Greco-Turkish War of 1920–2215 and authorized the islands of Imbros 
and Tenedos, the Rabbit Islands, and islands within three miles of the 
Asiatic coast to remain under Turkish control.16 
The Treaty of Peace with Italy (Treaty of Paris) marked the 
conclusion of World War II and fixed the boundaries of modern 
Greece.17 The Treaty of Paris transferred the Aegean islands, including 
Rhodes and the Dodecanese, from Italy to Greece.18 
After the Treaty of Lausanne, Greece and Turkey entered a thirty-
year détente.19 During this relatively peaceful era, Greece and Turkey 
became North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.20 
Commentators believed that Greek-Turkish relations would remain 
friendly.21 
 
 8. See id. at 32. 
 9. Id. at 39–41 (explaining that the British, French, and Russian fleets crippled the Turkish 
fleet during the decisive Battle of Navarino in October 1827). 
 10. Treaty of Constantinople, July 21, 1832, Gr. Brit.-Fr.-Russ., arts. 1, 8 LX B.S.P. 33.   
 11. See ACER, supra note 1, at 18.   
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Gr. Brit.-Fr.-It.-Japan-Greece-Rom.-Serb. 11–29, July 24, 
1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne] arts. 2–11. 
 15. See Scott Keefer, Solving the Greek Turkish Boundary Dispute, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 55, 57 (2003). Following World War I, Greek occupation of Turkey triggered the 
Greco-Turkish War of 1920–22. Id.   
 16. Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 14, art. 12. 
 17. Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 14, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245. 
 18. Id. 
 19. HARALAMBOS ATHANASOPULOS, GREECE, TURKEY AND THE AEGEAN SEA 6 (2001). 
 20. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey art. I, 
opened for signature Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350 (entered into force Feb. 15, 
1952). 
 21. See TOZUN BAHCHELI, GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS SINCE 1955, 16 (1990).  
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However, relations between Greece and Turkey were quickly 
damaged by the Cyprus problem.22 After Great Britain acquired Cyprus 
from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, feelings of nationalism stirred 
among the Greek-Cypriot majority.23 In 1955, Turkish demonstrators 
countered Greek-Cypriot demands for enosis24 by attacking Greek 
residents in Istanbul.25 The 1955 riots marked the end of the Greek-
Turkish détente.26 Years later, Greece and Turkey narrowly avoided war 
when Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus27 in July 1974.28 
Major conflicts in the Aegean also strained Greek-Turkish 
relations.29 First, oil exploration in the Aegean in 1973 generated 
disagreement between Greece and Turkey concerning the continental 
shelf delimitation.30 Second, the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) polarized Greek-Turkish positions 
regarding the Aegean territorial sea breadth.31 Third, the Imia crisis in 
1996 caused Turkey to question Greece’s territorial sovereignty over 
certain Aegean islands, islets, and rocks.32 
III.  CONFLICT 
Disagreements concerning the continental shelf delimitation and 
the territorial sea breadth in the Aegean increased hostility between 
Greece and Turkey.33 
 
 22. For an excellent discussion of the Cyprus problem, see ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 
19, at 14–45. Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, is approximately 500 
miles east of Greece and 40 miles south of Turkey. See BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 19. 
 23. BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 24; see also CLOGG, supra note 7, at 147. The population 
of Cyprus was roughly eighty percent Greek and twenty percent Turkish. CLOGG, supra note 7, at 
147. 
 24. Id. (defining enosis as union with Greece). 
 25. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 6; see also CLOGG, supra note 7, at 147–48. 
 26. See ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 6. 
 27. See generally FOREIGN OFFICE, CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS, 1959, Cmnd. 679 (UK) 
(creating the independent Republic of Cyprus). 
 28. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 8 (describing that Turkey occupied nearly forty 
percent of Cyprus in response to the illegal Greek coup against Cypriot President Makarios). 
 29. See Keefer, supra note 15, at 55. 
 30. ACER, supra note 1, at 36–42; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 46–49; see generally 
BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 130–41. 
 31. ACER, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 32. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 75–77; see also ACER, supra note 1, at 20–21; 
André Gerolymatos, The Military Balance of Power Between Greece and Turkey:  Tactical and 
Strategic Objectives, in THE AEGEAN SEA AFTER THE COLD WAR:  SECURITY AND LAW OF THE 
SEA ISSUES 47, 48–49 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2000); Krateros M. Ioannou, The Greek 
Territorial Sea, in GREECE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 115, 140–47 (Theodore C. Kariotis ed., 
1997) (discussing the Imia Incident and its historical context). 
 33. See generally BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 130–43 (discussing the continental shelf and 
territorial sea issues). 
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A.  Continental Shelf 
The Aegean continental shelf delimitation is a complex and 
controversial issue involving oil exploration rights, international 
conventions, and international boundary decisions.34 
1.  Context 
The Greek-Turkish continental shelf dispute stemmed from oil 
exploration in the Aegean.35 Greece began to search for oil in the early 
1960s.36 On November 1, 1973, Turkey responded by granting twenty-
seven exploration permits in the Aegean to the Turkish Petroleum 
Company.37 Turkey also published a map, illustrating planned 
exploration and research activities, which used a median line between 
the Greek and Turkish coasts to divide the Aegean continental shelf.38 In 
a diplomatic note, Greece claimed that the Turkish delimitation 
disregarded the continental shelves of the eastern Greek islands.39 
Turkey replied that the delimitation was equitable.40   
Without a resolution, Turkey sent its research vessel Candarli into 
disputed waters in May 1974.41 In July 1974, Turkey granted four 
additional concessions in the Aegean to the Turkish Petroleum 
Company.42 Greece objected to both actions.43 At the 1975 NATO 
summit in Brussels, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers finally 
issued a joint communiqué (Brussels Communiqué) regarding the 
 
 34. See generally id. at 130–41 (discussing the continental shelf issue). 
 35. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 46; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 130–31; see also 
ACER, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 36. ACER, supra note 1, at 36; Christos L. Rozakis, The Greek Continental Shelf, in GREECE 
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 67, 93–94 (Theodore C. Kariotis ed., 1997); see also BAHCHELI, 
supra note 21, at 130. 
 37. ACER, supra note 1, at 36; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 46; BAHCHELI, supra 
note 21, at 130. But see Rozakis, supra note 36, at 93 (claiming that the first incident in the 
Greek-Turkish dispute was the Turkish exploration, not the Greek). 
 38. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 46; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 95; see also ACER, 
supra note 1, at 37. 
 39. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 21 (Greek Note Verbale of 
Feb. 7, 1974); see also ACER, supra note 1, at 37; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 46; 
BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 131; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 93–94. 
 40. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings 23 (Turkish Note 
Verbale of Feb. 27, 1974); ACER, supra note 1, at 37; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 131; see also 
Rozakis, supra note 36, at 101. 
 41. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 131; see also 
ACER, supra note 1, at 37; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 94, 112 n.90.  
 42. ACER, supra note 1, at 38; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 94–95. 
 43. See Rozakis, supra note 36, at 95. 
  
2011] Rough Seas 391 
resolution of the Aegean continental shelf dispute.44 The Brussels 
Communiqué stated that the two nations should employ the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to settle the seabed dispute and 
utilize negotiation to solve other problems.45 
The Brussels Communiqué quickly dissolved, however, when 
Turkey sent its research vessel Hora into disputed waters to collect 
seismic data in August 1976.46 Considering the Turkish action as a 
threat to peace and security, Greece immediately referred the dispute to 
the United Nations Security Council (Security Council).47 At the same 
time, Greece submitted a unilateral application to the ICJ to settle the 
dispute and provide interim measures of protection.48 
Neither the Security Council nor the ICJ, however, resolved the 
Aegean continental shelf problem.49 The Security Council 
recommended that Greece and Turkey reduce tension in the region and 
settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations or appropriate judicial 
means, namely the ICJ.50 The ICJ subsequently rejected both elements 
of the Greek unilateral application.51 First, the ICJ denied the Greek 
request for interim measures due to insufficient evidence of “irreparable 
prejudice” to Greek rights in the Aegean seabed.52 Next, the ICJ found 
that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute.53 
 
 44. Joint Communiqué Issued After the Meeting of the Prime Ministers of Greece and 
Turkey, Messrs. Constatine Karamanlis and Suleyman Demirel in Brussels, 31 May 1975, 
reprinted in Annex I to letter dated Mar. 27, 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Greece 
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/18766 (Mar. 27, 1987) 
[hereinafter Brussels Communiqué]; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; BAHCHELI, supra 
note 21, at 133; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 95–96. 
 45. Brussels Communiqué, supra note 44, at 1; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; 
Rozakis, supra note 36, at 95–96. 
 46. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; see also Rozakis, supra note 36, at 96. 
 47. ACER, supra note 1, at 38–39; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; BAHCHELI, 
supra note 21, at 134; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 96. 
 48. ACER, supra note 1, at 39; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47; BAHCHELI, supra 
note 21, at 134; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 96–97. 
 49. See ACER, supra note 1, at 39–40; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 47–48; 
BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 135–36; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 97. 
 50. See S.C. Res. 395, U.N. SCOR, 31st Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32, at 16 (Aug. 25, 1976).  
 51. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Order, 1976 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 28–33 (Sept. 
11) [hereinafter Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Order]; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. 
Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 88–90, 107–108 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf Judgment]. 
 52. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Order, supra note 51, ¶ 33. 
 53. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 109. 
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Since the ICJ decision, the Aegean continental shelf problem 
remains unresolved.54 Pursuant to the 1976 Berne Protocol, Greece and 
Turkey agreed to refrain from prejudicial activities on the Aegean 
seabed and to study state practice and international law to aid the 
delimitation process.55 Greek and Turkish cooperation was short-lived, 
however. In 1987, Greece announced that it intended to drill for oil near 
the Greek island of Thassos.56 The Greek announcement prompted 
Turkey to send the Sismik-I into disputed waters.57 Pressure from the 
United States and NATO, however, caused both nations to abandon 
their plans for oil exploration in the Aegean.58 Following the Sismik-I 
crisis, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Davos, 
Switzerland in 1988 to reduce tension between the two countries.59 
Although the Davos process generated some goodwill, it did not provide 
a long-lasting solution to the Aegean dispute.60 
2.  International Conventions 
International conventions define the term “continental shelf” 
similarly.61 According to Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf (Geneva Convention), the continental shelf refers:  
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas;  
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to 
the coasts of islands.62 
 
 54. See Haritini Dipla, The Greco-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf: 
Attempts at Resolution, in GREECE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 153, 155 (Theodore C. Kariotis 
ed., 1997). 
 55. Agreement on Procedures for Negotiations of Aegean Continental Shelf Issue, Nov. 11, 
1976, Greece-Turk., 16 I.L.M. 13 (1977) ¶¶ 6–7. 
 56. See ACER, supra note 1, at 40–41; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 48. 
 57. See ACER, supra note 1, at 40–41; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 48. 
 58. Michael N. Schmitt, Aegean Angst:  A Historical and Legal Analysis of the Greco-
Turkish Dispute, ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 15, 41 (1996). 
 59. ACER, supra note 1, at 41; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 49. 
 60. ACER, supra note 1, at 41; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 49. 
 61. See, e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15.1 U.S.T. 471, 
499 U.N.T.S. 312 [hereinafter Convention on the Continental Shelf]; United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea]; see also ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 50. 
 62. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 61, art. 1. 
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Likewise, Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention (LOS Convention) defines the continental shelf as:  
the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its 
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance.63 
Article 121(2) of the LOS Convention states that “the continental 
shelf of an island [is] determined in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention applicable to other land territory.”64 Both the Geneva 
Convention and the LOS Convention grant a state exclusive exploration 
and exploitation rights over its continental shelf.65 
In addition, both conventions provide rules for continental shelf 
delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.66 Article 
6(1) of the Geneva Convention requires application of equidistance in 
the absence of agreement between states with opposite coasts.67 Article 
6(2) requires application of equidistance in the absence of agreement 
between adjoining states (unless special circumstances justify an 
alternate division).68  
However, Article 83(1) of the LOS Convention provides that 
“[t]he delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of 
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.”69 
3.  International Boundary Decisions 
The ICJ and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Court of 
Arbitration) interpreted the aforementioned international conventions in 
several relevant boundary decisions.  
 
 63. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 76. 
 64. Id. art. 121(2). 
 65. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 61, arts. 1, 2; UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 77. 
 66. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 61, art. 6; UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 83. 
 67. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 61, art. 6(1). 
 68. Id. art. 6(2). 
 69. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 83(1); see also Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (June 26, 1945) (explaining that the ICJ 
applies conventions, customs, and general principles of law). 
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i.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (North Sea),70 the ICJ 
opposed the uniform application of a particular delimitation scheme.71 
Despite consistent state practice of equidistance, the ICJ did not 
recognize Article 6 of the Geneva Convention as customary 
international law.72 Instead, the ICJ adopted a delimitation method based 
on equitable principles.73   
ii.  Channel Islands Case 
The Channel Islands Case, like the Greek-Turkish dispute, 
concerns the continental shelf delimitation between states with opposite 
coasts.74 The proximity of the British Channel Islands to the French 
mainland prevented a simple delimitation based on equidistance.75 
Unlike the Greek islands, however, the Channel Islands are “wholly 
detached” from the United Kingdom.76 Following the North Sea 
decision, the Court of Arbitration adopted an equitable delimitation 
scheme.77 In particular, the court divided the English Channel by a 
median line, but reserved a twelve-mile enclave around the British 
islands.78 The court noted that specific geographical circumstances 
should govern continental shelf delimitation.79   
iii.  Tunisia-Libya Case 
The ICJ also adopted an equitable delimitation scheme in the 
Tunisia-Libya Case.80 Specifically, the ICJ applied the “half-effect”81 
scheme to the Tunisian Kerkennah Islands, located near the Tunisian 
 
 70. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
 71. See id. ¶¶ 61–62; see also ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 58. 
 72. Rozakis, supra note 36, at 79. 
 73. Id. 
 74.  Delimitation of Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. 3, art. 2. (Ct. Arb. 1977) [hereinafter 
Channel Islands Case]. 
 75. See Rozakis, supra note 36, at 79. 
 76. Channel Islands Case, supra note 74, ¶ 199; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 79 
 77. See Rozakis, supra note 36, at 79.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Channel Islands Case, supra note 74, ¶ 96; ACER, supra note 1, at 162. 
 80. Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24). 
 81. Id. ¶ 129. The “half-effect” scheme gives “half, instead of full, effect to the offshore 
island in delimiting the equidistance line.” Rodman R. Bundy, Preparing for a Delimitation 
Case:  The Practitioner’s View, in MARITIME DELIMITATION 95, 116 (Rainer Lagoni & Daniel 
Vignes eds., 2006) (quoting the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Arbitration, 18 I.L.M. 
397, 455 (1979)). 
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coast.82 Nonetheless, the ICJ recognized that the Kerkennah Islands 
were entitled to a continental shelf.83   
iv.  Jan Mayen Case 
In the Jan Mayen Case, the ICJ also applied an equitable 
delimitation scheme to states with opposite coasts.84 The ICJ first 
applied a median line to the disputed area.85 Then, the ICJ determined 
whether particular circumstances required any adjustment of that line.86 
4.  Greek-Turkish Arguments 
Oil exploration in the Aegean polarized Greek-Turkish positions 
regarding the continental shelf delimitation.87 
i.  Greek Argument 
Greece argues that Turkey’s unilateral delimitation of the Aegean 
continental shelf is unacceptable and contrary to international law.88 
Citing international conventions, Greece alleges that every island is 
entitled to its own continental shelf.89 Therefore, Greece claims that its 
continental shelf should extend from the Greek mainland to a median 
line between the eastern Greek islands (which include Lesbos, Chios, 
Samos, Rhodes, and the Dodecanese Islands) and the Turkish coast.90 
Moreover, Greece maintains that the continental shelf dispute is purely 
a legal problem that should be resolved through judicial determination.91    
ii.  Turkish Argument 
Although Turkey is not a party to the Geneva Convention or the 
LOS Convention, it admits that islands possess continental shelves.92 
 
 82. Rozakis, supra note 36, at 79–80. 
 83. See id. at 80. 
 84. Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 
1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14) [hereinafter Jan Mayen Case]. 
 85. Id. ¶ 18; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 81. 
 86. See Jan Mayen Case, supra note 84, ¶ 22; see also Rozakis, supra note 36, at 81. 
 87. Patricia Carley, Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 PEACEWORKS 1, 1 
(1997). 
 88. See ACER, supra note 1, at 149. 
 89. See id. at 150; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 51; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 
131; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 94.  
 90. ACER, supra note 1, at 150–52; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 52; BAHCHELI, 
supra note 21, at 131–32; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 100–01.  
 91. See ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 50; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 132; Rozakis, 
supra note 36, at 95.  
 92. ACER, supra note 1, at 155. 
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Turkey argues, however, that the eastern Greek islands’ right to a 
continental shelf should be ignored to avoid an inequitable outcome.93 
Under the Greek scheme, Turkey estimates that ninety-seven percent of 
the Aegean seabed would belong to Greece, whereas only three percent 
would belong to Turkey.94 Turkey maintains, therefore, that the Aegean 
continental shelf should be divided according to equitable principles,95 
namely a median line between the Greek and Turkish coasts.96 
Furthermore, Turkey claims that the continental shelf dispute is an 
economic and political problem that should be solved through bilateral 
negotiations.97 
B.  Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea breadth issue that emerged during UNCLOS III 
also damaged Greek-Turkish relations.98 
1.  Context 
UNCLOS III,99 which convened in part to determine the breadth of 
the territorial sea,100 caused further tension between Greece and 
Turkey.101 Before UNCLOS III, states disagreed about the breadth of the 
territorial sea, but generally exceeded the customary three-mile limit.102 
 
 93. Id.; see also ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 52; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 132; 
Rozakis, supra note 36, at 94, 100. 
 94. See BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 132. 
 95. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, Dec. 10, 
1982, Turkey: Draft Article on Delimitation Between States, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.23 (July 26, 1974) (noting that equitable principles include the 
geomorphological and geological structure of the continental shelf and special circumstances, 
including the general configuration of respective coasts and the existence of one’s islands, islets, 
or rocks on another’s continental shelf); ACER, supra note 1, at 37, 153; ATHANASOPULOS, supra 
note 19, at 52; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 131; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 101.  
 96. ACER, supra note 1, at 37, 154; ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 52; BAHCHELI, 
supra note 21, at 132; Rozakis, supra note 36, at 98. 
 97. BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 132; see also ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 53; 
Rozakis, supra note 36, at 95. 
 98. See Ioannou, supra note 32, at 124–28. 
 99. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) convened in 
1973 and ended in 1982. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 320. See also 
Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: A Historical Perspective, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_historical_perspective.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Historical 
Perspective]. 
 100. See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art 3. 
 101. See, e.g., Ioannou, supra note 32, at 124–28 (discussing Greek-Turkish positions during 
UNCLOS III). 
 102. See Historical Perspective, supra note 99 (noting that before UNCLOS III, only twenty-
five states claimed a three-mile territorial sea limit, fifteen claimed a four to ten-mile territorial 
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In particular, Greece and Turkey each maintained a six-mile territorial 
sea in the Aegean.103 
UNCLOS III concluded in 1982 with the adoption of the LOS 
Convention.104 Article 3 of the LOS Convention grants every state the 
right to extend its territorial sea to twelve miles, measured from its 
baseline.105 Article 121 of the LOS Convention grants the same right to 
every island.106 Additionally, Article 15 of the LOS Convention 
prohibits states with opposite or adjacent coasts from extending their 
territorial sea beyond a median line.107 
2.  Greek-Turkish Arguments 
Greece and Turkey disagree on the appropriate territorial sea limit 
in the Aegean.108 
i.  Greek Argument 
Greece ratified the LOS Convention on July 21, 1995.109 Currently, 
Greece maintains a six-mile territorial sea in the Aegean.110 However, 
Greece overtly reserves the right to extend its territorial sea breadth to 
twelve miles.111 
 
sea limit, sixty-six claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea limit, and eight claimed a two hundred-
mile territorial sea limit); Ioannou, supra note 32, at 119–21. 
 103. ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 70. 
 104. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 320; see also Historical 
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 105. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 61, art. 3. 
 106. See id. art. 121. The twelve-mile territorial sea limit is now customary international law. 
Anastasia Strati, Greece and the Law of the Sea:  A Greek Perspective, in THE AEGEAN SEA 
AFTER THE COLD WAR:  SECURITY AND LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES 89, 92 (Aldo Chircop et al. 
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 108. See Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements, 
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last 
modified June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Declarations and Statements] (confirming Greece’s 
subscription to the rights and obligations of the Convention and describing how Greece interprets 
such navigation rights with regard to the geographical situation particular to Greece and Turkey); 
see also ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 71; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 142; Strati, supra 
note 106, at 92. 
 109. See Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20Un
ited%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea (last updated June 
3, 2011). 
 110. Strati, supra note 106, at 90; BAHCHELI, supra note 21, at 141; see also 
ATHANASOPULOS, supra note 19, at 70. 
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ii.  Turkish Argument 
Although Turkey extended its territorial sea to twelve miles in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, it maintains a six-mile territorial 
sea in the Aegean.112 Turkey claims that the Aegean should be exempt 
from the twelve-mile limit because it is a semi-enclosed sea.113 Further, 
Turkey argues that the delimitation of the territorial sea between states 
with opposite or adjacent coasts should be determined by an agreement 
that follows equitable principles and considers special circumstances.114   
 Turkey did not ratify the LOS Convention because it feared that 
Greece’s right to extend its territorial sea to twelve miles would 
transform the Aegean into a “Greek lake.”115 Currently, Greece has a 
35% share of the Aegean, whereas Turkey has a 7.6% share.116 If the 
breadth of the Greek territorial sea in the Aegean were extended to 
twelve miles, Greece would dominate 64% of the Aegean, whereas 
Turkey would control only 8.8%.117 A twelve-mile territorial sea would 
simultaneously reduce the proportion of high seas in the Aegean from 
56% to 26%.118 Turkey argues that a twelve-mile Greek territorial sea 
would impede its navigation rights in the Aegean.119 Thus, Turkey 
considers the extension of the Greek territorial sea in the Aegean to 
twelve miles to be a casus belli.120  
IV.  RESOLUTION 
Although previous attempts to solve the Aegean problem have 
failed,121 mechanisms currently exist to resolve the continental shelf and 
territorial sea disputes.  
The continental shelf dispute could be resolved by reference to 
prior international boundary decisions. Specifically, following the North 
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Sea decision,122 the ICJ or the Court of Arbitration should apply an 
equitable delimitation scheme to divide the Aegean continental shelf.  
The territorial sea dispute could be resolved through bilateral 
negotiations. During the course of such negotiations, each nation should 
agree to either maintain a six-mile territorial sea or devise an equitable 
solution that would account for the eastern Greek islands. Bilateral 
negotiations would allow the nations to choose the best option.  
Alternatively, Turkey’s potential accession to the European Union 
(EU) would create a promising climate for resolution.123 Turkey first 
applied for membership to the EU (formerly known as the European 
Economic Community) on July 31, 1959.124 Over fifty years later, 
however, Turkey’s accession to the EU is still uncertain.125 If Turkey 
joins the EU, the Aegean problem could be resolved through EU-
sponsored dispute settlement.126  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Greece and Turkey share the Aegean Sea and a long, turbulent 
history. In particular, disputes regarding the continental shelf 
delimitation and the territorial sea breadth continually spark tension 
between the two nations. To achieve lasting peace in the Aegean, 
Greece and Turkey must resolve their disputes through existing 
mechanisms or possible EU-sponsored dispute settlement.  
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